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The Minerals Sector of Zambia
Introduction
Histoiy
Ancient iron smelting most probably began in Zambia at the beginning of the first millennum by the 
Bantu speaking iron-age peoples. Copper was mined and smelted in numerous locations as is borne out 
by the many ancient workings on oxidized deposits particularly in the Katanga (Shaba) area of Zaire. 
There are fewer ancient workings on the Zambian side of the Copperbelt as most of the outcrops were 
leached of copper. Kanshansi and Bwana Mkubwa had important ancient workings on oxide (usually 
malachite) deposits1.
By the 16th Century copper was being extensively traded as ingots in the form of a St Andrews Cross. 
The first written reference to mining on the Copperbelt was in 1591 by Filippo Pigafetta in Rome based 
on information from a Portuguese traveller, Odoardo Lopez2. The ingots were traded via the Arabs on 
the east coast who had trading outposts as far down as Sofala (Beira). This lucrative trade in copper, gold, 
ivory and slaves was later taken over by the Portuguese.
When the first Europeans arrived in the area at the end of the last century copper mining had almost 
ceased except for a few workings in Katanga. It is estimated that over 100 thousand tonnes of copper 
from one million tonnes of ore was produced from the ancient Katanga workings. The ancient mines 
were limited by the water table and because sulphide ores could not be smelted3.
Following the gold and diamond rushes in the 1870’s and 1880’s in South Africa, the principal mining 
magnate, Cecil John Rhodes, started looking north for further mineral deposits to finance his dream of 
a Cape to Cairo railway. To this end he obtained a charter from the British Government for the British 
South Africa Company (BSAC) to penetrate the interior and set about obtaining “agreements” from 
, the traditional leaders for mineral rights.
In 1885 the border between the British and Belgian spheres of influence had been defined as the 
watershed between the Congo and Zambezi River basins, which runs through the middle of the 
Copperbelt. In the same year the BSAC obtained exclusive rights to minerals in the Rhodesias from 
Queen Victoria, valid until 1986.
The first colonial mining was at Kabwe on a lead/zinc deposit in 1905. In 1906 the railway reached this 
mine and concentrates were exported to Britain. Colonial copper mining started in 1908 with the first 
commercial production at Kansanshi, then in 1911 at Sable Antelope and in 1913 Bwana Mkubwa 
produced its first concentrate.
In 1922 company rule ended, but it retained its mineral rights and royalties, and granted exclusive 
prospecting rights over vast areas to large mining companies to undertake systematic exploration. In 
1923 Copper Ventures Limited obtained a concession along the Katanga border. In the same year the 
Nkana sulphide deposit was discovered and by the late twenties development work was underway on 
several of the Copperbelt deposits. Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) was formed in 1928 with British 
and American capital.
RSTlater became Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) with a 20% shareholding by the American Metals 
Company which later became AMAX Inc. Nchanga Consolidated Copper mines was formed in 1926 as 
a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. RST and the AAC controlled 
Zambian copper mining via their subsidiaries RCM and NCCM for the next 40 years.
With the onset of the depression in 1929, copper mining and prospecting virtually ceased. In 1931 the 
companies agreed to cut production by 75% in an attempt to face the crisis and several mines were closed 
during this period. By 1935 copper prices had rallied and 146 kt of copper was produced. The build-up 
to and outbreak of World War II rapidly increased demand for copper and by 1940 production had 
reached 265 kt.
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) became part of the settler controlled Central African Federation in 1953 
and during the copper boom of the fifties it was the principal source of revenue for the grouping. The 
nationalist movement, the African National Congress (ANC) of Northern Rhodesia, was founded in 
1948 and it split into two parties in 1958, the ZANC under Kenneth Kaunda and the ANC under Harry 
Nkumbula. The next year the ZANC was banned and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
was formed with Kaunda as its leader, which won the first general election in 1962.
Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964, under UNIP, and it was only a few hours before 
independence that the state managed to acquire the mineral rights to the country from the BSAC, for 
four million UKP. But the BSAC had previously granted mining concessions to RCM and NCCM, in 
the best areas, in perpetuity.
In 1970 the mines were nationalised and the companies were reorganised into Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) with 51% of the shares being held by 
the wholly state-owned Zambia Mining and Industrial Corporation Limited (ZIMCO) which issued 
bonds worth 331MUSD at 6% to the old owners for the 51% holding. The minority 49% of NCCM was 
held by Zambia Copper Investments (ZCI) owned by Minorco in Bermuda which is in turn owned by 
AAC and De Beers of South Africa. The 49% of RCM was held by RST International Inc., a subsidiary 
of AMAX Inc (20%), Security Nominees Limited (12%) and the public (16%).
In 1974 and 1975 the management agreements with AAC and AMAX were terminated and the state 
bought the issued bonds. NCCMand RCM were established as self-managing companies with Zambian 
managing directors. At the same time a subsidiary of ZIMCO was created, the Metal Marketing 
Corporation of Zambia (Memaco), to market all minerals produced in Zambia.
In 1979 the state converted part of its loans to NCCM and RCM into equity, thereby increasing its 
shareholding to 60% and 61% respectively. In 1982 ZCCM and RCM were merged to form Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. (ZCCM) in which the state’s holding is 60.3% via ZIMCO4. In 1987 
theRST9% holdingwas bought by a Greek businessman Mr AS. Sardanis, who had been a government 
representative on the Boards of NCCM and RCM in the early seventies, after nationalisation.
For Anglo American (NCCM) the Zambian buyout was an important source of foreign currency and 
a major boost to its international operations. Profits generated in South Africa were difficult to transfer 
outside the country. In the early seventies Minorco was a “brass nameplate” company in Bermuda, but 
with the capital injection from the Zambian buyout it became the principal international subsidiary of 
the Anglo-De Beers group and by 1990 its market value was over 3 billion USD5 and it has operations 
across the globe. Shortly after the buyout, copper prices fell in 1971/2, rose in 1974/5, fell until 1978, rose 
in 1979/80 then went into the long decline of the eighties. It could be thus argued that the TNCs gave 
up their share ownership of Zambian copper at an extremely propitious time. In addition, during the 
mercurial prices of the seventies, they were receiving direct payment for technical and management 
services to the companies that did not depend on the vagaries of copper prices.
3The Economy
Zambia covers 753,000 km2 and has a population of about eight million resulting in a low density of 
only ten persons per km2. During the eighties the Zambian economy was in crisis due to the collapse 
of copper prices. In 1988 it had a GDP/capita of about 344 USD, about half of the 1980 figure. The 
currency has been drastically devalued over the last decade from 1.26 USD to the Kwacha in 1980, to 
25 Kwacha to the USD in 1989. This has also been reflected in the extremely high rale of inflation, 1500% 
from 1980 to 1989. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) as a percentage of GDP is low, at less than 
10% of GDP reflecting the economic crisis.
/ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1. ZAMBIA, BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS
(KWacha) Unit 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988iiiiiiiiiiii i^ W^ss'isar'sr (it ±s '^j±i fcjs i±5 'd±'d;
Population M 5.9 6.1 6.4 7.0 7.6
Pop.density /km2 7.8 8.1 8.5 9.2 10.1
Forex Rate /USD .79 .93 1.79 4.17 8.22
CPI (1) ioo 128 183 381 847
gdp mp G 3.1 3.6 4.9 13.0 21.5
GDP/cap USD 659 635 428 447 344
GFCF (2) M 558 618 623 1061
GFCF/GDP % 18.2% 17 .2% 12.6% 8.2%
Debt (3) GUSD 2.38 2.63 2.78 5.64 6.50
Debt/GDP % 61% 68% 101% 181% 305%
Labour Force k 381 368 365 361 361
Govt Revenue G .77 .84 1.09 3.04
Source: CSO 1989.
V _______________________ :_____________________________________J
The national debt is the highest in the region at 6.9 billion USD in 1989 (204% of GDP), but debt service 
payments were only 14.2 of exports in 1988 due to a moratorium and rescheduling. But this means that 
at the present rate of repayment the debt grows without any further new borrowing.
Table 2. ZAMBIA; GDP BY SECTOR (MZKw)
Year Total GDP Agriculture Mining Manufacturing;
1965 649.9 8.2% 42.3% 7.3%
1970 1185.3 7.2% 36.8% 10.4%
1980 3063.6 14.2% 16.5% 18.5%
1985 6332.1 16.8% 9.1% 20.6%
1989 43637 13.6% 12.5% 34.7%
V. Source: CSO 1974 and 1989, ElU 1990. J
The economy is heavily dependent on the mining industry. Although its contribution to GDP has 
decreased from 42% in 1965 to 9% in 1988 it still constitutes almost all exports. The manufacturing 
sector expanded rapidly in the sixties and seventies, from 7% of GDP in 1965 to 19% in 1980, but its 
share of GDP has remained fairly constant in the 1980’s.
Declining copper prices have put severe strains on the economy. In real terms the average price of 
copper in the eighties was only half the average for the first ten years of independence. In addition 
production has been falling so that Zambia’s average real earnings from copper in the eighties have 
fallen 55% since its independence (1964). Although prices rallied somewhat in 1988 and 1989, they fell 
again at the end of the year.
4m m ...............
Table 3. COPPER PRICES AND ZAMBIAN COPPER EARNINGS 
AT CONSTANT 1964 VALUES
Year
us GNP Price 
deflatorus $/t
Indexed
Price
Export;
kt
Indexed
Exports
1964 100.00 988 100.0 681.0 100
1965 102.19 1316 130.3 683.0 131
1966 105.56 1547 148.3 599.0 130
1967 108.66 1148 106.9 601.0 94
1968 113.54 1252 111.6 643.0 105
1969 119.26 1485 126.1 730.0 135
1970 125.76 1413 113.7 684.0 114
1971 132.03 1087 83.3 635.0 78
1972 134.68 1069 80.3 711.0 84
1973 145.43 1784 124.1 670.0 122
1974 158.25 2053 131.3 673.4 130
1975 172.98 1235 72.2 641.2 68
1976 181.99 1409 78.3 745.7 86
1977 192.59 1310 68.8 666.6
1978 206.87 1362 66.7 589 .2 58
1979 224.74 1986 89.5 651.8 86
1980 245.65 2187 90.1 661.3 87
1981 268,85 1735 65.3 504.4 48
1982 284.98 1453 51.6 606.6 46
1983 296.10 1585 54.2 550.6
1984 306.93 1351 44.6 530.3 35
1985 316.04 1345 43.1 474.5 30
1986 324.31 1367 42.7 436.4
1987 334,57 1786 54.0 475.3 Il;l53llllllliilllliiil
1988 366.02 2601 71.9 398.2
1989 381.11 2866 76.1 440e 49
Source: CSO 1970 and 1989, Shearson Lehman Hulton 1989, Hugh Douglas 
1983, USGPO 1990._______________________________________________
The Zambian economy is now having to operate on about 40% of the foreign exchange (forex) that it 
had in 1970. In an attempt to counter the effects of declining terms of trade the local currency has been 
drastically devalued since 1982 when the Zambian Kwacha was worth about one US$. This has resulted 
in massive price hikes for basic commodities causing high inflation and significant erosion of salaries 
and wages in the formal sector.
Table 4. ZAMBIA, FOREIGN DEBT AND INDEX OF 
WHOLESALE PRICES (selected years)
Foreign Debt Debt Service wholesale 
Year GUS$ % GNP % of Exports Price Index
1970 0.63 37 5.9 100
1980 2.19 61 17.8 284
1982 2.38 66 17.4 320
1984 2.90 136 27.7 508
1987 4.35 228 13.5 2822
Sources: World Bank 1989, CSO 1989.
J
Since the onset of the decline in mineral export earnings Zambia’s foreign indebtedness has increased
considerably, from 60% of GDP in 1980 to a staggering 228% in 1987. Due to concessionary debt
rescheduling, debtservicinghas dropped from 28%ofcxporls in 1984 to 14% in 1987. Foreign disbursed
5debt in current USD increased 690% between 1970 and 1987. This was accompanied by rapid inflation 
reflected in the wholesale price index which increased from 100 in 1970 to 2822 in 1987.
Since 1984 Zambia has had a National Economic Diversification Programme (NEDP) to attempt to 
reduce the high dependency of the economy on the copper mining industry. The main other national 
resource is agriculture, but in the first seven years of the NEDP the role of agriculture has not expanded 
appreciably, particularly as a foreign exchange generator.
Under the IMF economic recovery programme Zambia instituted a foreign currency auctioning system 
in 1986 which was suspended in 1987 when the value of the Kwacha fell to 0.05 USD. After increases 
in basic commodity prices (maize meal) provoked riots on the Copperbelt in 1987, Zambia broke with 
the IMF and debt repayments were pegged at 10% of export earnings, but relations with the IMF were 
reestablished in 1989 and Zambia is now complying with a new IMF programme, including further 
devaluations of the currency, cuts in basic commodity subsidies and the lifting of price controls.
Zambia’s dependence on South Africa is in general lower than for many SADCC states but is high for 
imports (15 to 20%), particularly forstrategically important miningmachineryandconsumables, which 
are often significantly cheaper sourced from South Africa, with shorter delivery times. Less than one 
percent of exports go to South Africa, though a larger proportion (about 10%) are routed via South 
Africa. In 1988 the South African Chamber of Mines reported that there were no Zambian migrants on 
the South African gold and coal mines, and tourism from South Africa is insignificant.
However, some observers consider Zambia’s relationship with South Africa to be “...the most complex 
and apparently contradictory one in the region”6 in that although Zambia is a member of the Front Line 
States, has always supported sanctions against South Africa and has hosted the ANC headquarters and 
S WAPO Office, South Africa has done comparatively little to directly7 destabilise Zambia. In addition 
South Africa has become Zambia’s largest single source of imports. This is because, even more 
surprisingly, the South African government has been prepared to back exports through both credit and 
a range of export subsidies8.
One reason for this less aggressive stance by South Africa could be that it has used President Kaunda 
in the past as a mediator and as the South African internal situation worsens, there will be further need 
for outside mediation in negotiations with the South African democratic forces and that it is “...perhaps 
important not to antagonise Zambia any further by military action.”9 A further reason is that, although 
the mining industry has been nationalised, the Zambian elite is committed to the capitalist system in 
contrast to Angola and Mozambique who have suffered the most from South African destabilisation.
The Mining Sector
General
Zambia is highly dependent on copper mining, and its by-product cobalt, to the extent thalit is virtually 
a mono-mineral economy. The contribution of metals mining (copper, cobalt, zinc, lead and precious 
metals) to GDP has fallen from 38% in 1964 to 9% in 1988, while as a percentage of government revenue 
it has declined drastically from 53% at independence to 7% in 1987 (average 6% 1980-87). Its 
proportion of total formal employment has remained fairly constant at around 15%.
6r-------------------- - ---- --------- "  'n
Table 5. ZAMBIA, METALS MINING - CONTRIBUTION TO Gt)P, 
REVENUE AND EMPLOYMENT (%)
Year
Contribution 
to GDP
Contribution 
to Govt. Revenue
Contribution 
to Employment
1964 38 53 18
1968 38 60 15
1972 24 22 14
1976 18 15
1980 16 15
1984 14 15e
1988 9e 7* 14e
estimate, * 1987, Sources: C SO 1989, CISB 1970-80.
In US dollar terms, mineral production per capita, a crude reflection of the mineral intensity of a nation, 
has fallen from 253 in 1980 to 167 in 1988, while mineral production per miner fell from 24 thousand 
in 1980 to 15 thousand in 1984 before recovering to 23 thousand in 1988 (15.4 thousand 1980 USD). The
contribution of minerals to total export receipts averaged 94% for the period 1980 to 1988 and is almost 
entirely made up of copper, but due to low mineral profits mining only contributed an average of 6%
to government revenue during the eighties.
r  Table 6. ZAMBIA, BASIC MINERAL SECTOR DATA (Kwacha)
Unit 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Avg* 1
GDP Mining M 490 473 382 619 674 1102 2355 2689 2915
% GbP Mining % 16% 14% 11% 15% 14% 16% 18% 15% 14% 15%
Mineral Prod. M 1179 960 861 1251 1527 2688 5793 8391 10425
Min.Prod/cap us 253 184 152 161 133 147 200 130 167
Min.Exports M 986 903 911 1001 1109 1343 4928 7462 9119
% Min. Exports 96% 96% 96% 96% 93% 88% 92% 93% 93% 94%
Mining labour k 63 61 60 58 58 57 57 56 55
% mining labour 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 15% 15% 16%
Min.Prod/lab.kUS 23. 7 18. 1 15.5 17.3 14.6 17.2 24. 5 16.9 23. 0
Mining Revenue M • 42 11 0 53 94 129 405 207
% Mining Revenue 5% 1% 0% 5% 9% 8% 13% 7% 6%
^Average. Sources: CSO 1989.
Economic Geology
Zambia is located between the Zairean (Congo) and Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) cratons and hence 
contains both mobile belt and ancient craton features. Precambrian rocks underlie more than two thirds 
of the land area, which have been affected by several tectono-lhermal events resulting in a complex 
geology10. Seven structural-stratigraphic domains have been proposed:
1. The Bangweulu Block in the north-east
2. The Kibaran Belt running NE-SW in the east
3. The Katangan Sediments and the Lufilian Arc in the 
centre north-west
4. The Mozambique Belt in the extreme east
5. The Lower Palaeozoic Sediments
6. The Karoo System in the west and the rift valleys
7. The Barotse Basin in the extreme west.
Theoldest rocks are those of the Precambrian Basement Complex underlying the Bengweulu Block,
consisting of gneisses, granites and volcanics and contain mineral occurrences of gold, nickel, asbestos, 
copper, iron and manganese.
These are followed by rocks of the Katangan Complex of late Precambrian age consisting of a
7sedimentary sequence of shales, sandstones, dolomites, limestones, quartzites and conglomerates 
which have undergone only slight structural deformation in comparison to the basement complex. 
These rocks occur in the centre, the north-west and the south-west and host significant copper/cobalt 
and uranium deposits in the lower part of the sequence in the well-known Lufilian Arc of the Zambia/ 
Zaire Copperbelt. The Katangan Complex is also thesource of the Kabwe lead/zinc deposit in the centre 
of the country and contains iron and gold as well as industrial minerals such as limestone and graphite.
The Katangan sediments are overlain by quartzites, shales and arkoses of Lower Palaeozoic age in 
western Zambia and in the mid-Zambezi Valley. Sediments of the Karoo Supergroup comprise a Lower 
sequence of fine elastics and an Upper sequence of coarser elastics and occur in the Zambezi and 
Luangwa rift valleys and in western Zambia. The Lower Karoo hosts a substantial coal resource and the 
Upper Karoo has several uranium occurrences.
The Karoo sediments and volcanics are overlain by micaceous shales of Lower Cretaceous age in 
western Zambia. Pleistocene to Recent aeolian windblown Kalahari sands mantle much of the Western 
Province and extensive deposits of alluvium occur in river valleys.
The carbonatite complexes of Rufunsa and Isoka are sources of phosphate rocks and niobium deposits. 
The numerous gabbro intrusions host a significant nickel mineralisation at Munali, south of Lusaka. 
The younger Hook granite intrudes the Katangan System and contains a variety of copper-gold-silver 
deposits and magnetite contact metamorphic deposits.
There are numerous pegmatites which in the Kibaran in the south contain tin, tantalum and niobium. 
The Mozambique Mobile Belt in the east contains occurrences of gold, graphite and semi-precious 
stones.
Legislation
The laws governing exploration for and exploitation of minerals are contained in Chapter 329 of the 
Laws of Zambia, namely the Mines and Minerals Act of 1976. The right of searching for and mining of 
all minerals is vested in the President, in terms of this Act. To prospect, a reconnaissance or prospecting 
licence must be obtained. It is valid over a defined area, for a limited time period and for the defined 
mineral/s only and from this right stems the right to demarcate a proposed exploration area not 
exceeding 26 km2 in size and to acquire an exploration licence for the specific mineral deposit which is 
initially valid for three years.
To mine the deposit a mining licence must be obtained for the mineral/s within the prospecting or 
exploration area and is initially valid for a maximum of 25 years, after which it may be extended. For 
buildingor industrial minerals a mineral permit must be obtained and is renewable every 12 months. The 
Act also has extensive regulations pertaining to the safety of mining operations. All of these regulations 
are administered by the Chief Mining Engineer’s Department.
The above Act was principally drafted for large scale base metal mining. In 1984 the Act was amended 
specifically for small mining operations of industrial, precious and semi-precious minerals to include 
area charges (on prospecting and mining), utilisation fees (on industrial mineral mining) and licence 
fees (flat fee per mineral mined).
The Mines and Minerals Act does not cover hydrocarbons and radioactive (nuclear) minerals which 
have separate acts, the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act and the Prescribed Minerals Act. 
The main difference between the former and the Mines and Minerals Act is that it makes provision for
a P e tro leum  com m ittee, chaired  hv the  M in ister r>f M inw  -------** ' '
hydrocarbon exploration.
Mining companies are liable for income tax at the company tax rate of 45% of their taxable income. All 
the normal adjustments apply and only the mining specific deductions will be considered here. 
Prospecting and exploration expenditure is deductible in the year in which it is spent or carried over to 
income from the subsequent mining operations. Capital expenditure isdeducliblc immediately and the 
balance over ten years fora lead/zinc mine or twenty years for any other mine, in equal amounts. Mining 
losses can be carried back against profits for the previous year and any remaining losses are carried 
forward against future profits.
Mineral tax is not payable for the first five years of operation; after that it operates at the following 
percentages of taxable income: copper 51%; cobalt, lead and zinc, 20%; amethyst and beryl, 15% and, 
gold, selenium, silver, bismuth and cadmium, 10%. Mineral tax itself is an allowable deduction in 
determining the taxable income for income tax. Mineral export tax is set at 10% of the value of exported 
minerals and since 1985 is deductible for calculating taxable income.
Repatriation of dividends to foreign shareholders is allowed, after the payment of with-holding tax, at 
the rate of 50% of after tax profits accruing to non-resident shareholders or 15% of external paid up 
capital, whichever is the lesser. Foreign companies may borrow locally up to the amount that was 
brought into the country.
Minerals Marketing
Since 1975, all metals marketing has been carried out by the parastatal, the Metal Marketing Corpora­
tion of Zambia Limited (Memaco), a subsidiary of ZIMCO. Memaco has two subsidiaries in London, 
Memaco Services Ltd. and Memaco Trading Ltd. which deal with their trading in Europe. The 
transportation of metals is carried out by the ZCCM subsidiary Zamcargo Limited. The reason for 
setting up a state minerals marketing authority when the state already controls the mining industry is 
unclear, except to save on forex commissions for agents. But firstly,* copper is a known commodity, 
traded on the LME, with low commissions and secondly, it is by no means clear that the forex costs of 
running Memaco, including their overseas offices, is less than what would have been paid in commis­
sions. However, in the seventies the old owners were making huge profits from marketing the copper, 
particularly Amax11, and thus the government may have thought that setting up its own marketing 
authority was the only alternative.
Zambia, as a land-locked country, regularly has problems in transporting its minerals to ports for 
shipment overseas. The western route along the Benguela Railway to Lobito Bay in Angola has been 
out of action since 1975 due to South African sabotage and sabotage by the RSA and USA backed 
UNITA bandits. Since 1974 the new Tazara Railway to Dar es Salaam has been used but this line has 
had major maintenance problems over the last few years so that the southern route through the RSA 
to the port of East London has also been used. A small amount of metal is also transported to Dar es 
Salaam by road by the Zambia Tanzania Road Services (ZTRS), but at a very high cost. It generally takes 
about three months for the copper to travel from the refinery to the warehouses in Europe. The high 
value metals are airfreighted (gold and silver).
The majority of Memaco’s sales are for copper which is traded at the LME price plus the high grade 
premium (about 20 UKP). Wirebar production and sales have been on the decline due to a decrease in 
the demand for this form. The principal markets for Zambian copper arc Japan, France, the UK, Italy, 
West Germany and Sweden. ZCCM owns 50% of a copper rod (CCR) manufacturing company, Societe
9de Coulee Continue de Cuivre (SCCC), in France which sells about 170 kt/an of wirerod, produced from 
Zambian copper.
Memaco appears to be an experienced trader of copper on the world markets and has managed to build 
up a core of personnel in the difficult field of metals trading who have over the years acquired the 
confidence of several international customers for the Zambian high grade product. They have a major 
disadvantage with regard to their competitors due to their long delivery times (about 3 months to 
Europe) but they appear to have overcome this via copper exchanges to facilitate timely deliveries. 
Given their experience and overseas infrastructure they could save the other (small) copper producers 
in other countries of the region much needed forex if they were to market their production for them.
Zambia is a member of CIPEC but this body has never been an effective producer organisation in terms 
of stemming the declining price of copper mainly due to the large proportion of supply coming from 
developed countries and their companies12, and the renegade policies of some third world producers 
such as Chile since 197313. The 1985 demise of the last effective metal producer body, the 1TC, does not 
augur well for the establishment of CIPEC as an active producer cartel.
Labour
The expatriate mining labour force was 16% of the total in 1964 then steadily declined to 1.5% in 1988
and has further declined since then. This reduction has come about principally due to a rapid increase
in mining company in-house training programmes since independence. In 1989 there were 181ZCCM
employees on sponsorship and a further 210 Zambian students on company scholarships in Zambia and
overseas14. The creation of the School of Mines at the University of Zambia in 1971 has also increased
the number of Zambian professionals in the mining industry.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7, ZAMBIA, MINING EMPLOYMENT
Copper(cobalt) Lead/Zinc Total %
Year Zambian Expat. % Zambian Expat . « Expat
1964 39203 7326 15.7 1828 490 21.1 48847 16.0
1968 43198 4845 10.1 2118 366 14.7 50527 10.3
1972 46245 4600 9.1 2175 295 11.9 53315 9.1
1976 53082 4060 7.1 2744 224 7.6 60110 7.1
1980 55258 2485 4.3 2593 123 4.5 60459 4.3
1984 na na na na 58104 3.1
1988 na na na na 55000e 1.5
^  Sources: CISB 1968-80, ZCCM 1989, C SO 1989
In 1983 the average earnings in the mining industry were 4129 ZK per year, 43% more than for industry 
as a whole, but due to the crisis in mining the gap has since narrowed. Within the mining industry the 
ratio of Zambian to expatriate earnings was 1:2.7, compared to 1:4.7 in 1970, mainly due to a significant 
increase of Zambians in professional and managerial positions rather than a relative increase in the 
wages of workers. From 1970 to 1983 average annual earnings of Zambian miners increased by 269% 
in current terms but as inflation was about 410% over thesame period, earnings fell by 45% in real terms. 
Since then wage increases have lagged well behind inflation so that in real terms earnings have fallen 
substantially, especially since forex auctioning was introduced at the end of 1985 which provoked a 
massive devaluation of the currency and runaway inflation.
Fatalities per thousand workers fell steadily from 1956 to 1974 by 50%, but since then have remained 
fairly static at around one death per 2000 workers. Serious injuries per thousand workers dropped by 
47% from 1964 to 1982. From 1982 the rate has remained constant at about 32 per 1000 workers. The
10
two principal causes of fatalities were the handling of equipment and rock falls. With increasing 
production from opencast and tailings retreaiment, the incidence of accidents is likely to fall.
In the early years of copper mining, most of the labour was migrant and unskilled15, and mining was 
labour-intensive and unmechanised. The “white” expatriate labour was permanent and held all the 
skilled (artisanal), professional and managerial positions while the “black” labour was migrant and 
filled only unskilled and semi-skilled positions. However, from the 1960’s there was an increasing 
tendency towards a more settled labour force with concommitan t increase of skill levels and mechanised 
mining methods. Foreign migrant labour peaked in the 1955-59 period at 16 thousand/annum (mainly 
Tanzanian and Malawian) representing 27% of the total labour force16 of 57 thousand. By 1980 the 
labour force was 63 thousand and almost all permanent.
The first miners strikes took place in 1935 in response to a unilateral increase in taxation by the colonial 
government and was not broken before six miners had been killed. In 1937 a white miners union was 
formed to attempt to maintain white privileges and to stem the advancement of the black workers into 
“white” jobs.
The first African trade union was formed in 1948 and by 1949 the Northern Rhodesia African 
Mineworkers Trade Union had branches across the Copperbelt. Its main focus was on removing the 
racist job barriers which were supported by the white union and instituting a non-racial system of equal 
pay for equal work. In 1955 the African union went on strike on the issue of wage increases and the 
demand for a closed shop. The turnout was virtually 100% and the strike lasted 58 days before the 
companies agreed to their demands.
The racist job barriers were only dismantled in 1963, a year before independence. The last racial union, 
the Zambia Expatriate Mineworkers Union, was dissolved in 1969. The Mineworkers Union of Zambia 
(MUZ) was formed in 1967 by a merger of the old union with the staff and mine police associations.
During the period of high copper prices up to 1975, M UZ made significant advances in improving the 
real wages and working conditions of its members, but since 1975 the mining companies have had 
negligible surpluses due to the falling real price of copper and the M UZ has been unable to halt the 
steady decline of the living standards of its members.
In 1985 there was an unofficial strike over the deduction at source of pensions. The strike only had a 
turnout of about 30% after the first day and was essentially a failure, especially in terms of the Union 
as, after government intervention, membership was made voluntary rather than automatic resulting in 
a 25% loss of union dues.
Given the fact of the declining profitability of copper mining and that miners arestillsubstantially better 
off than workers in general (300% better than agricultural workers in 1983), it is unlikely that MUZ will 
be able to halt the declining real earnings of its members.
ZCCM .
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) accounts for all of Zambia’s copper, cobalt, lead, zinc and 
pyrites production. The company is 60% state owned via the state holding company Zambia Mining and 
Industrial Corporation (ZIMCO). The only significant minority shareholding is 27% held by Zambia 
Copper Investment Ltd. which is owned by Anglo American and De Beers of South Africa via their 
subsidiary Minorco in Luxemburg.
In 1982 Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines and Roan Consolidated Mines were merged to form
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ZCCM. RCM and NCCM had been the major companies from the beginning of large scale copper 
mining in the early 1930’s.
In 1971 long-term debt represented 7% of total capital employed but with the fall in copper prices in 
1975 this proportion rose to 20% and the debt became increasingly foreign denominated. By 1989 98% 
of the long-term debt was foreign, most of it in US$ (50%) and had increased to 35% of capital 
employed17.
Profits have also reflected the value of copper on the world market and have slumped since 1975 except 
for 1980when the price of cobalt (a major by-product of copper production) shot up and in 1988/9when 
the price copper improved. Profits as a proportion of sales averaged 36% between 1971 and 1975 but 
had fallen to 2% over the period 1982 to 1989 and were only 6% of capital employed for the entire period 
(1971 to 1989)18.
Table 8. ZCCM: FINANCIAL PROFILE (constant 1981 MUSD)
Sales Capital Profit1 Tax P/C^ Div^ Debt Int4 Cost5
1971 935 757 404 200 27% 102 50 1 84
1972 755 882 224 60 19% 80 111 3 84
1973 936 1095 285 81 19% 105 153 9 78
1974 1493 1217 775 477 24% 172 183 11 71
1975 1161 1497 277 136 9% 37 285 12 llliililllil
1976 859 1750 -90 -84 -0% 0 360 39 81
1977 1028 1511 83 54 2% 0 314 42 67
1978 808 1296 -75 -48 -2% 0 244 40 60
1979 1116 1688 126 13 7% 6 267 48 61
1980 1329 1715 284 112 10% 29 234 39 68
1981s 1312 1852 42 -26 4% 11 337 50 83
1982 1001 1505 -145 3 -10% 0 494 48 85
1983 739 1284 -93 3 -8% 0 477 45 62
1984 771 1012 52 52 0% 0 438 61 52
1985 673 1467 52 52 0% 0 410 53 46
1986 492 1819 36 43 -0% 0 495 38 34
1987 633 2001 19 70 -3% 0 563 72 49
1988 10916 1457 59 25 2% 0 501 62 62
1989 12286 1173 184 60 11% 9 408 51 58
1 pre tax,2 final profit/capital,2 divendends,4 interest payments,4 real US cents per lb Cu 
(cost of own sales/copper production),5 For 1971-81 the US$ Manufacturing Unit Value 
Index deflator was used and from 1982-89 the US GNP deflator was used, 6 including sales 
o f metals bought-in and delivered to its customers by an associated company. Sources: 
Radetzki, 1985 (1971-82); ZCCM, 1989 (1983-9).
The low real costs per pound of copper produced from 1977 to 1980 are principally due to the 
devaluation of the Kwacha in 197619. Unit costs then rose for 1981 and 1982 before falling to an all-time 
low in 1986 due to rapid devaluations of the currency from 1981, but then rose slightly in 1988 and 1989. 
This rise is partly due to the fact that the costAb is calculated by dividing the total cost of sales by copper 
production only. If the cost of producing cobalt, lead, zinc and other by-products was included, the unit 
cost for copper would be substantially lower. In 1985 the cost of copper production made up 92% of the 
total cost of all production.
ZCCM has managed to remain profitable in the face of falling real copper prices by drastically reducing 
the real wages of workers which have not kept up with the high inflation rate in part caused by the 
devaluation of the national currency.
12
Metals brought-in and delivered to customers by an associated company have become a major 
proportion of sales and in 1988/9 constituted 34%, up from 22% in 1987/8. This is done to fulfil prior 
contracted supply commitments.
From 1983 a Mineral Export Tax was introduced and is charged on the gross amount received from sales 
of all minerals exported, irrespective of the company’s profits. Initially this levy was 4% of exports but 
was increased to 8%. This system meant that ZCCM would have had to pay taxes in excess of profits 
unless the net profit before tax exceeded 30% of turnover. After representations to government the 
Income Tax Act was amended in 1985 so that the Mineral Export Tax was allowed as a deduction in the 
calculation of mineral and income taxes, but at the increased rate of 13% of exports20. In an attempt to 
rehabilitate the company, it has been exempt from Mineral Export Tax from January 198821.
In January 1986 the company announced a “survival plan” which entailed the closure of Kansanshi 
mine, Chambishi mine, number 3 shaft at Konkola, the Luanshya smelter, the Ndola refinery tank- 
house and two concentrators. These closures will result in the laying-off of about 3000 workers. This 
plan arose out of the results of two studies done by outside consultants in 1985 on ZCCM. According 
to these studies ZCCM is a viable enterprise if it is allocated the foreign exchange it requires to operate 
and if it is allowed to trim unprofitable operations22. ,
Since the late seventies the company has not been able to get the necessary foreign currency to operate 
efficiently, resulting in the deterioration of plant and machinery and higher operating costs. The 
government is unable to give the company the foreign exchange that it needs (about 40% of earnings) 
due to the requirements of the rest of the economy. It appears that the company has decided to drop 
the more costly operations and to concentrate its limited forex on the most viable operations in order 
to bring itself back to profitability. In this manner overall output will remain constant by increasing the 
production of the remaining operations.
The company plans to keep cobalt and copper production steady at about 4-4,5 kt/an and 450-470 kt/ 
an respectively and to reduce staff levels to 53,000 with 800 expatriates23.
Mineral Production 
General
. v
Table 9. ZAMBIA: METAL PRODUCTION & EXPORTS,
AVERAGES FOR 1964-88.
Metal Cu Zn Pb Co Coal
Avg.Production kt 617 41.0 16.3 2.54 601
% mineral prod. 88% 2.4% 0.7% 4.1% 1.3%
Avg.Exports kt 613 39.4 13.6 2.25 nap
% tot.exports 90% 2.5% 0.7% 2.6% nap
Sourcet C SO 1974,1989
V ____________________________________________________ /
s.Over the same period copper averaged 90%, zinc 2.5%, lead 0.7% and cobalt 2.6%. Copper exports 
peaked in 1976 at 746 kt and have steadily fallen since then to 398 kt in 1988. Zinc and lead exports both 
peaked in 1972 at 60.6 and 26.7 kt respectively. By 1988 zinc exports had fallen to 19.2 kt and lead 
exports had dropped to 3.7 kt. Cobalt exports on the other hand have been increasing and in 1988 
5171 tonnes left the country, accounting for 6% of total exports.
Zambia’s share of world copper output has fallen steadily since 1960, by 64% from 13.6% to 4.9%. It 
was never a world league producer of either zinc or lead, but is a major world producer of cobalt. In 1988 
Zambian cobalt production constituted 16% of world output, and with neighbouring Zaire, about half
of global production.
Table 10. ZAMBIA: SHARE OF WORLD MINE PRODUCTION.
World Zambia % World Zambia % World Zambia %
Ifear copper Copper World Zinc Zinc World Lead Lead Worldssismtsssxsrs ======
1960 4243 576 13.6 3351 34 1.0 2376 16 0.7
1964 4859 632 13.1 3987 52 1.3 2570 15 0.6
1968 5476 685 12.5 5120 59 1.2 3034 24 0.8
1972 7045 718 10.2 5822 56 1.0 3556 26 0.7
1976 7873 709 9.0 6222 37 0.6 3475 14 0.4
1980 7837 596 7.6 6213 33 0.5 3566 10 0.3
1984 8130e 521 6.4 6742 29 0.4 3386 9 0.3
1988 8700e 422 4.9 7100 20 0.3 3400 6 0.2
Sources: CSO 1970 & 1989, BGS 1989. y
Although the Zambian minerals industry is dominated by copper, a variety of other minerals are 
produced. The main by-products or co-products of copper mining are cobalt, selenium and gold while 
silver and, in the past, cadmium are by-products of lead/zinc mining. In addition several other minerals 
are produced for copper mining and refining such as coal, pyrite and lime. Finally there is some small 
scale mining independent of the copper industry such as manganese, talc, emeralds, beryl, felspar and 
phyllite.
f  Table 11. ZAMBIA: SELECTED MINERAL PRODUCTION.
Mineral unit 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 %Chg1
Cassiterite t na na na na 3.1 24.1 1.9 1.8
Coal kt 623 898 569 511 557 463 524 395 -37%
Cobalt kt 2.05 1.84 3.31 4.42 4.34 4.48 5.03 4.49 119%
Copper kt 683 640 610 480 460 483 422 451 -34%
Emeralds t na na na .12 .41 .99 1.04 .33
Felspar kt na 1.17 .48 .19 .21 .05 .12 .02
Gold t .170 .501 .329 .350 .058 .350 .262 .149 -12%
Lead kt 27.3 19.1 10.0 8.0 6.6 8.0 6.4 3.9 -86%
Limestone Mt na .755 .698 .702 .705 .720 .999 .775
Cement kt na na 310 316 334 375 405 386
Lime kt na na 182 256 243 235 239 230
Manganese kt na na .38 .98 .55 .00 .50 .35
Pyrite kt na 19.0 3.2 28.3 19.2 45.4 67.5 60.1
Selenium kt na 36.5 22.7 19.5 22.1 27.1 24.4 21.4
silver t 47.8 31.1 23.8 18.9 26.8 29.9 29.3 19.8 -59%
Talc kt 1.3 .0 .0 9.5 .3 .3 .1 .1 -89%
Zinc kt 53.5 46.9 32.7 22.9 22.5 21.0 20.2 12.9 -77%
^  % change 1970-89, Source: Ministry of Mines 1990,_________________________ ^
Copper (Cobalt)
From the commencement of large sea le mining in t he 1930’s to 1988 about 1,1 G t of ore grading roughly 
2.7% Cu have been treated yielding about 25 Mt of copper and 89 kt of cobalt. In 1985 reserves and 
resources were estimated at 1.6 Gtonnes grading on average 2.55% Cu and in 1989 proven reserves were 
estimated at 421 Mt grading 3.17% Cu, which means that the average grade treated over the next 18 
years will be roughly 2.2% Cu, assuming a dilution factor of 30%24. However, in 1975 reserves stood at
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828 Mt grading 3.1% Cu and by 1989 half (48%) had been mined leaving a balance of 421 Mt grading 
3.2% Cu which will last until the year 2005, assuming an annual depletion rate of 25 Mt. Since 1975 
407 Mt of ore have been extracted which would leave a theoretical balance of 422 Mt in 1989. As the 
actual balance is 421 Mt, it would appear that there has been no delineation of new reserves in the last 
14 years.
r Table 12. ZCCM: COPPER & COBALT RESERVES 25
31 March 1975 31 March 1989
ore ore x Ore ore x %
Mine Mt %CU grade %Co Mt %Cu grade %co ChangeXISC3SSS&SS3S3BSatSS.SS3XS:SBBXS&S £x£isiisis«'£±ii&is& S==S=S=S=5=S!
Nchanga 252.33 3.42 8.63 na 118.46 4.00 4.74 .58 -45%4
Mufulira 143.9 3.15 4.53 67.95 3.17 2.15 -52%
Nkana 119.93 2.44 2.93 na 100.73 2.34 2.36 .14 -19%4
Luanshya 72.1 2.56 1.85 33.68 2.47 .83 -55%
Baluba 64.4 2.62 1.69 .16 42.47 2.50 1.06 .17 -37%
Chibuluma 8.4 4.58 .38 8.81 3.29 .29 -25%
Chambishi 42.3 2.91 1.23 shut -100%
Konkola 125.I3 3.55 4.44 na : 48.59 3.90 1.90 .07 -57%4
Total: 828.4 3.10 25.68 420.69 3.17 13.33 -48%
1 total reserves,2 Cu metal content,3 as at 31 Dec 1974.4 The old NCCM definition of 
^  reserves is different to that of ZCCM. Sources: NCCM 1975, RCM 1975, ZCCM 1989. ^
In addition to the above reserves, ZCCM geologists have estimated that resources of copper amount to 
a further 30 million tonnes of metal within the company’s existing Copperbelt Mining Licenceareas, but 
these are generally deep and/or low grade and/or in difficult ground and/or are difficult to treat. Thus 
much of the resources may not be economic to mine, depending on prices and technological improve­
ments. Nevertheless they would add at least 5 to 10 years to the 15 to 20 year life of the reserves. In 
addition there are a few, smaller, copper deposits away from the Copperbelt, particularly in the north­
west.
In general about 25 Mt of ore grading on average about 2.2% copper are mined annually from both open 
pit and underground operations. The ore then goes to the concentrators where it is crushed and milled 
before going to flotation cells to produce several concentrates. The sulphide concentrate (25 to 45% Cu) 
is then mixed with limestone and smelted in reverberatory or electric furnaces producing a matte which 
goes into converters to remove the iron and sulphur, resulting in blister copper (about 99.8% Cu) which 
is then cast into anodes ready for electro-refining.
The cobalt concentrate is sent to the Cobalt Plants at Nkana or Chambishi for refining into pure cobalt. 
The high grade oxide concentrates (12% Cu) are acid leached at the Nchanga High Grade Leach Plant 
(HGLP) where the copper is recovered by electro-winning. The tailings leach plants (TLP) treat current 
and old tailings and low grade liquor from the HGLP. The copper is recovered by electro-winning, 
producing cathodes which are then further refined by poling to remove the oxygen before being cast into 
high grade wirebars.
The blister anodes from the smelters are electro-refined onto copper starter sheets producing high 
grade cathodes ready for export. Sulphur is recovered from the converter chimneys at Nkana and 
Chambishi for the production of acid for electro-refining and leaching, but the lower concentration 
sulphur emissions from the reverbatory furnaces are released into the atmosphere.
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Tabic 13. ZCCM, COPPER ORE TREATED AND GRADE
Nchanga^L Mufulira Nkana Luanshya2 Other TOTAL
Year Mt %3 Mt %3 Mt %3 Mt %3 Mt %3 Mt %3
i'is±£ittts=±5====== = = = = a a s s a == = == !2 = = = = = = = » = = = a t t « = » t = = =
1972 10.2 3.72 5.9 2.15 5.6 1.78 6.3 1.55 5.2 3.36 33.2 2.65
1974 9.8 3.45 7.1 2.17 5.5 1.66 7.1 1.38 6.4 3.04 35.9 2.46
1976 9.6 3.61 6.6 2.36 4.8 1.61 6.1 1.45 5.7 3.08 33.1 2.57
1978 9.1 3.34 6.3 2.31 4.2 1.55 5.7 1.55 5.9 2.78 31.2 2.46
1980 9.1 3.33 5.7 2.10 4.2 1.53 5.9 1.44 6.4 2.27 31.2 2.29
1982 9.8 2.85 5.7 1.86 4.1 1.47 6.0 1.41 6.4 2.29 31.9 2.18
1984 10.4 2.84 4.4 2.13 3.9 1.61 5.5 1.44 5.3 1.93 29.5 2.15
1986 9.7 2.60 4.0 2,10 3.5 1.40 4.9 1.40 3.9 2.20 26.0 2.09
1988e 8.9 3.09 4.8 1.97 3.3 1.38 4.4 1.57 1.7 2.60 23.1 2.19
% 4 39% 21% 14% 19% 7% 100%
1 including Chambishi,2 including Baluba,3 % metal content,4 % total production 
^  in 1988. Source: CSO 1989, ZCCM 1989._______________________________ _____
The average grade treated has steadily fallen from 2.65% in 1972 to 2.19% in 1988, representing a drop 
of 17% over 13 years. The gross tonnage of ore milled has also fallen, by 11% over the same period.
Before 1985 ZCCM had seven operating divisions, namely Nkana, Nchanga, Mufulira, Luanshya, 
Kalulushi, Konkola and Kabwe and in that year Kalulushi Division was dissolved and its mines were 
incorporated into Nkana and Nchanga divisions and in 1986 Konkola Division was incorporated into 
Nchanga. Hence there are now five divisions, namely Nchanga (Nchanga, Konkola and Chambishi 
mine), Nkana (Nkana, Chibuluma and Chambishi cobalt and acid plants), Luanshya (Luanshya and 
Baluba), Mufulira and Kabwe (Kabwe and Nampundwe). This reduction of divisions is a reflection of 
the overall reduction in copper output (down 40% from 1976 to 1989).
Table 14. ZCCM, COPPER SMELTER AND LEACH PLANT PRODUCTION
_____ 1988/9
Smelter/Plant Copper (kt) % Recovery Copper (kt) % Recovery
Mufulira smelter 156.81 94.6 159.7 96.6
Nkana Smelter 308.92 94.0 149.2 94.6
Luanshya smelter 117.51 94.1 nap
Nchanga HGLP 104.42 82.7 20.0 48.3
Nchanga TLP nap 97.7 61.5
1 Year ended 30:06:73, 2 Year ended 31:03:73. Sources: NCCM, 1973; RCM, 1973;
^  ZCCM, 1989.
The copper refineries are located at Mufulira and Nkana and the cobalt plants at Nkana and Chambishi. 
In addition there is a Precious Metals Plant at Ndola which is administered by Mufulira Division. The 
Precious Metals Plant produces selenium (about 25 t/an), silver (about 25 t/an) and gold (about 300 kg/ 
an), all of which is exported. The plant could also treat the slimes from other refineries in the region such 
as Alaska and Eiffel Flats in Zimbabwe, but these are currently being sent outside the region.
The proportion of copper production from the leaching of tailings has steadily increased from zero in 
1970 to 20% in 1981/2, to 28% in 1988/9 and is expected to rise even further. Excess refining capacity 
is being used to treat blister from Zaire, and the Mufulira smelter has treated Zairean concentrates on 
a toll basis. Small quantities of concentrate are also toll treated for small scale operators. There is also 
the possibility of ZCCM treating the future gold/silver/copper matte from the Kahama deposit in
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Tanzania, if its development goes ahead.
Table 15. ZCCM, COPPER REFINERY, COBALT PLANT AND 
PRECIOUS METALS PLANT PRODUCTION
1972/3 1982/3 1988/9 % Change1
Copper (kt)
Mufulira 274.I2 220.5 198.03 -28%
Nkana 315.92 156.1 155.3 -51%
Ndola 133.2 106.2 shut -100%
Cobalt (tonnes) 
Nkana 2137 419 2373 +11%
ChambiBhi 789 1793 2498 +217%
Precious Metals Plant 
Selenium (t) na 22.1 24.1 +9%
silver (t) na 27.5 24.1 -12%
Cold (kg) na 371 227 -39%
1 % change from 1972/3 to 1988/9, except for precious metals (1983-89),
2 year ended 30/06,3 including 28.9 kt toll-refined. Sources: RCM 1973,
v  NCCM 1973, ZCCM 1983 & 1989______________ _________________
Lead & Zinc
Kabwe mine comes under Kabwe Division and used to be known as Broken Hill due to its similarity to 
the Australian deposit and once was one of the highest grade lead/zinc mines in the world. Mining 
started in 1906 making it the oldest operating mine in Zambia. Lead and zinc are produced with silver 
and, in the past, cadmium as by-products.
In the concentrator the sulphide ores are floated off and go to the Imperial Smelting Furnace (ISF) and
the oxide tailings are dumped and later batch leached. The ISF produces low grade zinc (Zn4) and lead
bullion which is further refined in drossing kettles resulting in high grade lead (99.9999%) and a small
amount of silver. The old dumps grading 12% to 15% Pb plus Zn are processed in two Waelz Kilns and
lead and zinc clinker are extracted from the futnes. The lead goes to the ISF and the zinc is leached then
electro-won with the leached concentrator tailings to produce high grade zinc (Zn2) for export.
/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\
Table 16. KABWE DIVISION LEAD & ZINC, PRODUCTION PROFILE
Production 1972/3 1982/3 1988/9 %Change
Ore Milled (kt) 355 210 133 -63%
Grade (% Zn) 21.8 25.0 9.0 -59%
Grade (% Pb) 11.1 11.0 18.9 +70%
ISP1 Lead Bullion 34.2 21.3 11.7 -66%
ISF1 Zinc (Zn4 kt) 32.0 28.4 12.4 -61%
EZP2 Zinc (Zn2 kt) 23.8 11.7 6.1 -74%
Refined Lead (kt) 30.3 15.2 9.1 -70%
Silver (t) 0.0 3.06 3.43 nap
cadmium (t) 16.24 0.0 0.0 -100%
1 Imperial Smelting Furnace,2 Electrolytic Zinc 
^  Plant. Sources: NCCM 1973, ZCCM 1983 and 1989.___________________ ^
The main ore body is almost mined out and the possibility of treating the dumps using Australian 
Sirosmelt technology to produce 2 kt/an of lead for the local market is being investigated26. A  project 
to identify possible sources of lead/zinc from deposits in neighbouring countries was not fruitful. There 
are known deposits at Mpande in Tanzania and Copper Queen in Zimbabwe. Alternative industries to 
replace mining are also being considered including the possibility of setting up an aluminium refinery
based on cheap local energy and imported alumina and a small iron and steel works has also been 
proposed.
Coal
The coal mining company, Maamba Collieries, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the State holding 
company, Z1MCO. It is an opencast operation working the coal seams of the Karoo System on the 
Zambezi Valley (graben) in the south-east of the country. Mining started in 1966, but production has 
declined since 1973 when 940 kt were produced, due to falling demand from its main customer, ZCCM. 
Current production is at the rate of about 400 kt/an of which a small amount is exported to customers 
in the region (Malawi, Tanzania and Zaire).
The deposits only contain steam coal with almost no coking properties, making it necessary for ZCCM 
to import coke from Wankie Colliery in Zimbabwe. A comprehensive techno-economic study of the 
operation was been undertaken by outside consultants27 funded by the World Bank and a rehabilitation 
project, with assistance from the African Development Bank, has been implemented to restore 
productive capacity. Proved coal reserves at Maamba are estimated at 70 Mt with a further 18 Mt 
classified as probable, adequate at current exploitation rates for 150 years.
Sulphur (Pyrites)
Kabwe Division also runs the Nampundwe pyrites mine west of Lusaka. The pyrites is used for the 
production of acid at the Nkana Acid Plant and some (about 3 kt/m) is sold to Nitrogen Chemicals of 
Zambia (NCZ) for the same purpose. Reserves are estimated at 8.6 Mt grading 16.3% sulphur. The 
mine produces about 75 kt/an of pyrite concentrate from about 300 kt/an of ore. A small amount of 
copper concentrate is also produced.
However, the bulk of sulphur production comes from the chimneys of the copper converters on the 
Copperbelt. The Nkana Acid Plant produces about 200 kt/an of acid and the Chambishi Acid Plant 
about 80 kt/an. The installation of a new Chilean (El Teniente) converter at Nkana plus the rehabili­
tation of the Nkana Acid plant should increase production to 250 kt/an. All the acid is used by ZCCM, 
principally for tailings leaching.
There is an overall acid shortage in the region and it is hoped that Zambia will be in a position to export 
once the Nkana Plant is refurbished. Zimbabwe has an acid shortage and the development of the 
Kanyemba uranium/vanadium deposit in the Zambezi Valley would require a cheap source of large 
quantities of sulphuric acid to treat the ore.
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A small quantity of tin is mined in the Choma Tin Belt of southern Zambia from pegmatites and related 
eluvial placers. Reserves are estimated at 215 tonnes of cassiterite in widely scattered small deposits. It 
has been mined since 1935 and in 1989 production was 1.75 tonnes of cassiterite concentrate. Non 
Ferrous Metal Works in Ndola produces a small amount of low grade tin metal for the manufacture of 
solder, but the quality is not high enough for tin plating.
In addition to cassiterite (tin), the pegmatites also contain columbite (niobium) and tantalite (tanta­
lum). The Kamativi Tin Mine across the border in Zimbabwe, is also based on a pegmatite, but in 
addition to its own production its smelter takes cassiterite/tantalite feed from small operators on 
surrounding pegmatites and is running below capacity. The possibility of sourcing feed from the Choma 
Tin Bell would therefore appear to warrant further investigati
Other Minerals
Several other minerals are exploited in Zambia, the principal ones being limestone, manganese, 
magnetite, felspar, talc, phyllite, emeralds, beryl and other semi-precious stones. In 1988 there were 
fifty-five companies and cooperatives holding eighty-two Mining Licences and twenty-one Building 
Licences (for stone, sand, limestone and clay).
Manganese ore was produced until 1968 at the rate of roughly 50 kt/an and is still exploited on a small 
scale in the north of the country for the manufacture of batteries by Mansa Batteries Ltd. Reserves in 
Luapula and Central Province are estimated at some 1.5 Mt grading from 45% to 86% M n02scattered 
over nine deposits. The other main area is the Kabwe-Mkushi area, but unsuryeyed deposits occur over 
mostof the country. Trial shipments have been made to Zimalloys (an AACcompany) in Zimbabwe for 
the manufacture of ferromanganese for the steelworks (Zisco). Zimbabwe currently imports manga­
nese ore from South Africa.
Amethyst is mined by Mindeco Small Mines Ltd, International DGC Mining Company and Lonrho on 
small operations in the Southern Province near Kariba and Kalomo. Production in 1989 was 6275 kg. 
Emeralds are mined by Kagem limited from several small-scale operations. Official production was 
1214 kg in 1989, but large quantities are mined illicitly and smuggled out of the countiy.
Felspar is also mined by Mindeco Small Mines at Nantukombo who are also small scale producers of 
limestone (Michinga), tourmaline (Nyimba) and magnetite (Namatobwe).
In 1989 775 ktonnes of limestone was quarried from which 239 kt of lime and 405 kt of cement were 
produced by Ndola Cement and Chilanga Cement, for the local construction and metallurgical 
industries. Ndola lime was tested by Zimalloys in Zimbabwe for suitability as a flux for ferrochrome 
manufacture, to replace burnt lime imports front South Africa, but the phosphorus content of the 
Zambian product was too high.
Interest has recently been shown in the Munali nickel deposit south-east of Lusaka by Outokumpu Oy 
(Finland) and also by Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC, an AAC company) in Zimbabwe. BNC’s is 
facing a future shortage of ore, due to the depletion of reserves at its own mines, and is looking for 
alternative sources of ore or concentrate. The Munali copper/nickel sulphide deposit was assessed by 
Zamanglo in the early seventies when the geological reserves were estimated at 11.7 Mt averaging 
1.04% nickel and 0.15% copper28. The mining lease is currently held by Apollo Mining, a local earth- 
moving company.
Asubstantial high grade fluorspar deposit at Sianyolo on Lake Kariba has been explored by Agip (Italy). 
Reserves are estimated at 2 Mt and exploitation would be viable for exports if the project did not have 
to cany the high infrastructural costs (road and power line)29.
Agip have also carried out extensive exploration of a vast low grade uranium deposit with associated 
copper in the Malundwe and Chimiwungo areas west of Solwezi in the north-west. Copper reserves of 
about one billion tonnes grading 0.8% Cu with appreciable gold (about 0.2 g/t) have been estimated. 
Further development is dependent on an improvement in the international uranium price. 
Kanshanshi Mine was closed in 1986 but has been reopened to be worked by small scale operators who 
sell their ore to a ZCCM run concentrator. The ore grades about 3% Cu and has significant gold (about
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2g/t) which in fact represents Zambia’s largest gold resource. Zambia has many other gold occurrences, 
particularly in the Luiri gold belt where ZCCM has several dump retreatment operations and the old 
Matala Mine is being rehabilitated. ZCCM’s Small Mines Development Unit reopened the Dunrobin 
Mine near Mumbwa in 1989 with reserves of 58 kg of contained gold in old dumps.
Zambia has no large high grade iron deposits, but there are numerous small occurrences of ore and there 
have been projects for the establishment of an iron and steel industry since the early seventies. Studies 
have been carried out on the Sanje deposit near Lusaka and the Chisasa deposit west of Solwezi. There 
are also deposits at Pamba Hills, Mulombe, Nagaibwa, Chongwe, Chisama, Nampundwe, Cheta, 
Shimyoka, Nambala, Kampumba and Chitindulu Hills.
In 1989 an agreement was signed with a Soviet company to investigate the feasibility of setting up a small, 
100 kt/an, steel plant30. The ore will come from Nambala, near Mumbwa, and be trucked 280 km by road 
to a proposed iron and steel plant at Kabwc, in an attempt to avoid the death of the town when the lead/ 
zinc mine finally closes. However, a UNIDO study31 on iron and steel in the SADCC/PTA region 
concluded that basic billet production capacity at Zisco in Zimbabwe was adequate for the whole region, 
but considering that these would have to be purchased in scarce foreign currency, it may make economic 
sense for Zambia to develop its own capacity, even though the initial capital costs would also be in 
foreign currency.
Scaw Foundries of Kitwe smelts scrap in an electric furnace for the production of grinding media for 
ZCCM. but has regular problems in obtaining adequate feed. The company was purchased by ZCCM 
from Anglo American in 198832 and is under rehabilitation.
Thereare low grade phosphatedepositsincarbonatitecomplexesatNkombwaHillat the north-western 
end of the Luangwa Valley and a group of ring complexes in the Rufunsa area, west of the confluence 
of the Luangwa and Zambezi rivers (Kaluwe, Nachomba, Mwambuto and Chasweta), which also 
, contain resources of niobium and tantalum. Exploitation of the latter group, for the production of 
phosphate fertilizer, is still under consideration, particularly Kaluwe which has 6.6 Mt in soils at 
5.7% P2Os and 207 Mt in rock at 2.6% P20 5. A syenite deposit near Mumbwe containingapatite is also 
being assessed as a phosphate source.
As is the case with Dorowa in Zimbabwe, the exploitation of low grade carbonatite deposits only makes 
sense in strictly national terms, as the final product is likely to cost well above the world market price, 
but would be available to farmers in local currency. Regional logic would however favour the 
development of the vast high grade phosphate deposits of Angola (Kindonacaxe and Mongo Tando), 
Tanzania (Minjinju) and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique (Evate).
Zambia has no hydrocarbons, but interest has been shown in the sedimentary basins. Placid Oil (Hunt 
Petroleum) drilled in the northern Luangwa Valley in 1987/8, but without result. Mobil Oil did a seismic 
survey of the south Luangwa valley, but with no follow up drilling, and they plan to survey the southern 
part pf the mid-Zambezi Valley in Zimbabwe, which is shared with Zambia. There is an oil refinery at 
Indeni outside Ndola which receives crude via the Tazama pipeline from Dar es Salaam.
A United Nations study33 to determine exploration requirements in 1988 isolated seven areas warrant­
ing further work. These were:
20
The Nkombwa Hill Carbonatite 
The Mumbwa North Apatite 
Peat (as a soil conditioner)
Serenje Pegmatites 
Lusaka Marble 
Kabwe West Pb/Zn 
Chinyunyu Polymetallics
Infrastructure
The infrastructure along the central spine, going from Livingstone in the south, through Lusaka to the 
Copperbelt, is good, with rail, road and power lines running all the way. But the vast western and eastern 
areas are poorly served and the roads that do exist are generally in a bad state of repair. There are 
international rail connections to Zimbabwe in the south (and on to Botswana, Mozambique and South 
Africa), Zaire in the north (and on to Angola) and Tanzania in the north-east along theTazara railroad. 
Most imports and exports are via Dar es Salaam in Tanzania as the Benguela line to Lobito in Angola 
is out of action due to South African and UNITA sabotage.
Zambia has hydro power stations at Victoria Falls, Kariba and Kafue Gorge with a capacity greater than 
national demand. Exports have been made to Zimbabwe, but in 1989 power was imported from 
Zimbabwe and Zaire due to a fire at the Kafue station. The cost of electricity is one of the lowest in the 
world;
Any mineral development off the Line-of-Rail would probably require a high initial capital outlay for 
infrastructure and in fact some viable projects remain undeveloped due to the poor road, rail and power 
links, such as theSianyolo fluorspar project and, to some extent, the vast low grade copper and uranium 
deposits in the north-west.
Several international banks are represented in the country, but in general the financial sector is not well 
developed and has been severely weakened by the collapse of the national currency and the severe 
restrictions on foreign exchange. There is no slock exchange.
Local production of inputs to the mining industry is fairly diversified with many of the enterprises 
coming under theZCCM. In general there exists a significant ability to manufacture locally a wide range 
of spares and equipment for the mining industry. The major constraint faced by the companies 
concerned is the shortage of foreign currency to import the necessary raw materials, especially the 
various grades of steels.
ZCCM has extensive in-house repair and maintenance capabilities in the divisional workshops and 
several of the raw materials consumed by ZCCM are produced within the company, by a subsidiary of 
the company or by a subsidiary of its mother company ZIMCO.
In 1984 ZES (Zambi Engineering Services) carried out a feasibility study for ZCCM on the creation of 
a factory (Parts Manufacturing Facility) for the manufacture ofsparesfor the mining industry which are 
presently imported. This new facility will manufacture roughly 800 items that have a large turnover and 
areof medium to high value. The cost of establishing the factory in 1984 was 127 MZKw (17 MUKP in 
forex) and it is planned that it will save about 28 MUKP (1984) of forex per annum. The buildings are 
90% completed and foreign finance for the equipment is now being sought.
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It is apparent that there exists a substantial local capacity for supplying the necessary inputs to mining, 
but that this resource is under-utilised due to the shortage of imported inputs to these industries, caused 
by the national shortage of forex which is in turn caused by the rapid decline in the real value of copper 
over the last decade.
Theinability of the mining inputs industries to supply the mining industry with a substantial proportion 
of its needs has resulted in the ZCCM needing to retain a large part of their forex earnings (about 40%) 
to finance imports of mining inputs in order to operate efficiently, but due to the forex shortage at the 
national level the company has only been able to retain about 30% of its export earnings which has 
resulted in the running down of plant and machinery and lower efficiency and output. This downward 
spiral has been described by thecompany as a “scl f-reinforcing negative process” and the rationalisation 
plan currently being implemented is apparently an attempt to break out of it, but at the cost of shutting 
down a significant part of their productive capacity.
Downstream Metal Transformation
The only significant refined copper consumer in the country is Metal Fabricators of Zambia Limited 
(Zamefa). This company is based in Luanshya and started operations in 1970. It is 51% owned by 
INDECO (state), 15% by Phelps Dodge (US), 5% by Svenska Metallverken (Swedish), 9.8% by Amax 
Zambia (US), 9.8% by ZAMIC (AAC) and 9.4% by Continental Ore Resources Limited (local). Both 
Phelps Dodge and Svenska Metallverken provide management and technical services to the company, 
the former on the extrusion and rod section and the latter on the wire and cable section.
Zamefa’s copper consumption is planned to reach tenkt/an of cathodes and 80 tonnes of billets, 
representing about 2% of Zambian refined copper production. They pay ZCCM the high grade LME 
price for copper minus the transport costs to Europe, estimated at roughly 140 UKP/tonne, They also 
consume about 300 tonnes per annum of aluminium billets and rod. Small amounts of tin are imported 
from Zimbabwe after local tin produced by Non-Ferrous Metal Works proved to be unsuitable due to 
its low quality.
The bulk of their production is continuous cast copper rod (CCR) mainly for export. For this an 
Outokumpu continuous caster was acquired in 1983, which replaced the previous extruded rod process. 
Other products include copper cable and wire including telephone cable. Power cable is manufactured 
up to a limit of 3 kV, but the company is installing plant to produce 11 kV cable.
Almost all of their non-rod output is for the domestic market, although there is some export of 
telephone cables to the regional market, mainly to Malawi. CCR constitutes 98% of their exports and 
about 60% of their turnover. The CCR is sold at between 40 and 80 UKP above the LME price for high 
grade copper. Their main obstacle to increasing exports is in acquiring long term customers. Due to a 
worldwide CCR excess capacity, customers prefer to shop around rather than to go for long term 
contracts. It also will take some time before they can become accepted as a reliable supplier.
Their main' imports are PVC (Zimbabwe and RSA), armour wire (RSA), plastics (UK), tin (RSA and 
Zimbabwe), aluminium (RSA), aluminium tapes (Sweden), aluminium casts (UK), jelly fill (Belgium) 
and graphite (Zimbabwe). Zambia has graphite deposits but these are not being considered as a source 
at present.
Due to the exports retention scheme (50%) they do not have a problem in getting their forex, but if in 
fact they use up their full 50% and export CCR at 40 to 80 UKP above the price that ZCCM could obtain
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for the cathodes, this would make them a net forex consumer in lieu of the forex lost on the cathodes 
they consume.
The company has been trying to penetrate the regional (SADCC/PTA) market but with very little 
success. The main reason for this is that many of the cable consuming power projects in the region are 
financed by tied aid, but they have also lost open tenders to western countries, partly due the inability 
of the Bank of Zambia to offer competitive credit facilities. The regional market for copper semis was 
estimated at 21 kt in 198434. This would seem to indicate that there is substantial scope for expansion 
into this market, but it is limited due to the factors mentioned, plus the fact that several of the other 
states in the region have some copper semis manufacturing capability, especially Zimbabwe where the 
capacity is possibly superior to that of Zambia35. In addition it appears that both countries are at present 
expanding their capacity with the regional market in mind. It would therefore be in the interest of 
regional integration if an organisation like the SADCC were to attempt to rationalise the production 
of copper semis and manufactures in the region.
A study on the “Production and Exports of Copper Semis in Zambia and South Eastern Africa”36 
concluded that Zamefa CCR plant was viable, but that the regional production capacity for extruded 
products far exceeded demand making it difficult for any one of the companies to operate at a profit and 
that the regional market for fiat-rolled products would only justify a small plant in Zambia if thealready 
existing second-hand mill in Zimbabwe (Radiator & Tinning of Bulawayo) was not able to produce 
products of sufficient quality.
ZCCM owns 50% of Societe de Coulee Continue de Cuivre (SCCC) in France, a CCR producer, via its 
wholly-owned subsidiary in the UK, ZAL Holdings Ltd. which also owns ZES. The other 50% of SCCC 
is held by Thomson Brandt SA of France. The total issued share capital of SCCC is 36 MFF and it 
produces about 170 kt/an of CCR most of which is sold in France.
The logic of this joint north-south venture which generates MVA for a developed country is not 
immediately apparent, especially as MEMACO’s Annual Report for 1985 mentions that SCCC 
managed to export 40% of its sales “...in spite of the competition from...plants in developing coun­
tries”37. Surely then ZAMEFA is one of these pla n is. There also do not appear to be any benefits by way 
of acquiring technology as ZAMEFA is receiving technological services from Swedish and American 
companies rather than Thomson Brandt of France. In addition it does not seem to be a major customer 
as ZCCM’s copper sales to France were only 48% of the tonnage sold by SCCC and only 14% of ZCCM’s 
sales worldwide. One reason for this investment could be to avoid EEC tariffs on copper semis by 
manufacturing them in Europe.
Discussion
The paramount role of the mining industry of Zambia has been as the capital generator and foreign 
exchange earner for the development of the rest of the economy. It has provoked virtually no 
. downstream development of metal-based manufacturing industries in its 85 years of existence. Over 
98% of refined copper production is exported, while less than two percent is further transformed in the 
country, of which about half is exported. The national and regional off-take of lead has been increasing 
over the the last decade, but the lead reserves are almost exhausted. Local consumption of zinc is low 
and reserves are limited.
From 1964 to 1974, during the period of relatively high copper prices, non-ferrous mining supplied the 
capital to support a rapid expansion in the manufacturing sector principally for import substitution. It
also generated the forex for the imported intermediate goods and raw materials for these new industries. 
Due to the high copper earnings between 1965 and 1973 copper mining was able to support an average 
annual real growth rate of GDP of 3% and real per capi ta incomes increased by about 20% over the same 
period38. Manufacturing grew from 6.1% of GDP in 1964 to over 13% in 197439.
From 1975 copper earnings began to fall and the average annual growth of GDP from 1973 to 1983 was 
only 0.2%, a decrease of 93% on the preceding decade. The average annual growth of GNP/capita from 
1965 to 1987 was negative at -2.1% and the average annual growth of gross domestic investment from 
1965 to 1973 was 6.2% but had fallen to minus 12.5% for the period 1973 to 1983 and -9.3 for 1980-8740.
Falling terms of trade for copper over the last fifteen years have caused the whole economy to stagnate, 
bringinginto sharp focus the dangers ofa development strategy based on raw material exports and the 
vagaries of the world market. The mining industry of Zambia is vertically integrated into the developed 
market economies rather than supplying the raw materials for local and regional industry.
An alternative role for the non-ferrous sector would be to provide the basis for a resource-based 
industrialisation strategy. The local and regional markets are clearly not large enough to absorb 
Zambia's total copper production even if all imported copper-based products were manufactured in the 
region, but a significant increase in the production of copper semis and manufactures for export onto 
the world market would appear to be feasible based on the significant transport cost discount on the 
LME price for the copper inputs, that would apply. The world market for finished copper-based 
products is more stable than that for copper.
A  resource-based industrialisation strategy would therefore entail firstly the production of metal based 
products for the local market, secondly to supply the metal inputs to the regional industries, thirdly to 
export metal based products onto the world market and finally to export the remaining production onto 
the world markets still in the form of metal. For copper, the local market could absorb about 2% of 
production, the regional market about 10% and if a further 40% of production could be transformed 
before export, it would leave only half of production to be exported as metal with declining terms of 
trade. For lead and zinc, a regional resource based industrialization programme would enable the 
absorption of the bulk of production, especially after the planned production cut backs.
In fact the story of Zambian lead is an excellent example of the dangers of a mineral-export-based 
industrialisation strategy: From 1915 to 1988 eight hundred thousand tonnes of high grade lead was 
exported to thedeveloped countries in exchange for their manufactured goods, some of which contained 
lead. At the same time the lead consumption by Zambian industry slowly increased to about 2,000 t/an, 
only to be confronted with the end of lead supplies as the Kabwe mine was exhausted. Hence by the time 
that Zambian industry was developed enough to consume some of the country’s lead, all that was left 
was a hole in the ground.
Over the last decade there has been an alarming stagnation of the Zambian agricultural sector and the 
resultant drift to the urban areas of peasant farmers. In 1974 cereal imports amounted to 93 kt, but by 
1983 this had risen to 247 kt and then fell to 150 kt in 198741. Maize was exported until 1976 (61 kt), but 
since then imports have generally had to be made to make up the shortfall. At independence in 1964 
Zambia exported 12 kt of tobacco, but exports steadily fell to a low of 0.7 kt in 1986 before recovering 
: somewhat to 2.5 kt in 1988 (0.2% of exports)42, an example of the small success of the export 
diversification programme.
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Average food production per capita decreased by 26% from 1974-76 to 1981-83, though admittedly the 
country was in the throes of a drought in the latter period43. The decline in agriculture has resulted in 
a movement of the rural population to the urban areas. By 1987 the urban population was estimated at 
almost 50% of the total, while at the same time earnings and employment in the urban areas has been 
declined.
The deterioration of the agricultural sector has been in part due to the fall in export earnings provoking 
a shortage of agricultural inputs, but it is also the result of low producer prices for agricultural 
commodities. Over the last three years producer prices have increased substantially in an effort to 
encourage production and at thesame time real earnings of urban workers have been falling. Hopefully 
the combination of these two factors will halt and eventually reverse the drift to the urban areas.
Due to the extremely high dependence of the Zambian economy on metals mining, the restructuring of 
its economy must not only attempt to restructure the mining sector itself in terms of downstream 
processing, but must develop the country’s other major resource, agriculture, to balance what is 
presently a lopsided copper economy. Doing this within the present situation of chronic foreign 
exchange shortages and a massive foreign debt burden is going to be extremely difficult.
A regionally integrated approach to the problem could well have a higher chance of success. The 
countries of the SADCC as a group do not have the same dependence on mining for export earnings 
(about 50% excluding oil). In addition many of the products presently imported by Zambia are produced 
elsewhere in the region (particularly Zimbabwe), while Zambia has both surplus power (HEP) and land.
Limited regional cooperation in metal refining has already taken place in the case of copper-nickel 
matte from Botswana being refined in Zimbabwe. Possibilities also exist for the refining in Zambia of 
the precious metal slimes from copper refining in Zimbabwe and the refining in Zimbabweof any future 
nickel concentrate production from Munali in Zambia and cassiterite/tantalite/microlite/columbite 
concentrates from the Choma Tin belt. The SADCC Mining Coordinating Unit has an expatriate 
mining engineer to facilitate the regional sharing of processing facilities, but thus far all initiatives have 
been completely independent of the Unit, directly between the producer and refiner.
At present both Zambia and Zimbabwe are attempting to penetrate the same, fairly limited, regional 
i market for copper and copper alloy semis and finished goods. In addition Zambia is planning an 
integrated iron and steel market that would compete with the already existing plant in Zimbabwe. 
Regional integration of the transformation of metals would necessitate the planning of the location of 
manufacturing plants to achieve an equitabledistributionof the benefits and to avoid costlyduplication. 
Apossible partial solution to an efficient and equitable division, in the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
would be for Zimbabwe to concentrate on ferrous products and Zambia to concentrate on non-ferrous 
products, instead of the current duplication and low capacity utilisation.
Such a division would also be based on each country’s resources and experience in that the Zimbabwean 
copper mines are nearing the end of their life, it has no zinc production and almost no lead production, 
while Zambia has substantial copper reserves and limited reserves of lead and zinc. Neither country has 
significant aluminium occurrences. On the ferrous side, Zimbabwe has a well-established iron and steel 
plant and is a producer of ferrochrome, fcrrosilicon chrome, ferrosilicon, ferromanganese, nickel and 
several other steel alloy metals.
The main obstacle to a rationalisation along these lines would be that it would require the transfer of 
recently installed non-ferrous plant from Zimbabwe to Zambia, which the Zimbabweans would not be
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keen to do as they would not trust the Zambians to be capable of producing a product of sufficient quality 
and to be able to effect prompt delivery. It would also be extremely difficult to get the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe to agree to the transfer.
On the Zambian side, however, it is quite likely that they would agree to shelve their iron and steel plant 
if they were sure that they could pay for all the ferrous products they need from Zimbabwe with their 
exports of non-ferrous products and semis to Zimbabwe.
In conclusion, the Zambian economy is highly dependent on copper mining and displays all the typical 
ailmentsofa mineral-based peripheral economy with a huge, unpayable, debt burden, in part contracted 
because the lenders relied on future mineral earnings for repayment. The main other resource, 
agriculture, received almost none of the mineral surpluses in the fifties and sixties and contracted until 
the improvement in prices for agricultural prod ucc in the eighties. However, Zambia still has significant 
mineral resources, particularly of industrial, fertiliser and construction minerals for local development, 
and is thus likely to remain a mineral economy for some lime, albeit at a lower level. The enormous 
investment in human resources for the mining industry over the last two decades will be wasted if 
alternative minerals are not developed.
With regard to regional integration in mining, Zambia, with the largest mining industry, could be a 
major beneficiaiy as it already produces many of the mining inputs imported by other countries in the 
region and it imports many items already produced in the region. It also imports several mineral and 
mineral-based items from the region, particularly iron and steel. However, the level of its copper and 
cobalt output is such that the region will not constitute a significant market in the short to medium term. 
The apparent low priority given by the Zambian government to its SADCC sectoral coordination 
responsibilty is surprising given the advantages that could be gained by Zambia through regional 
integration in mining.
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